Australian Public Sector
Anti-Corruption Conference 2011

Keynote Address

by

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Introduction
I am very pleased to have been invited to address the Australian Public Sector Anti-Corruption Conference 2011, and to welcome delegates to this conference to the beautiful city of Fremantle. Later in this paper I will refer briefly to the developing role of agencies within the integrity branch of government in Australia and elsewhere. The creation of these agencies reflects community appreciation of the value of integrity and propriety within the ever burgeoning agencies of government. Conferences such as this provide agencies within the integrity branch having a particular focus, in this case anti-corruption, to confer with respect to best practice and to learn from each other. That process can only enhance the effectiveness of the agencies represented here today, and that can only be to the benefit of our community.

The Traditional Owners
Before proceeding any further, however, I would like to acknowledge the traditional owners of the lands upon which we meet, who are the Wadjuk people who inhabit this part of the coastal plain which separates the hills which contemporary Australians know as the Darling Ranges from the sea. The river which enters the sea a few blocks from where we meet is known to the Wadjuk people as Debarl Yerrigan, and to more recent arrivals in Australia as the Swan River, and occupies a particularly significant place in the dreamtime of the original inhabitants, as it is the home of the Wagyl - a serpentine creature of particular significance in Wadjuk culture. The Wadjuk people form part of the great Nyungar clan of south-western Australia, and I would like to pay my respects to their Elders past and present.
Public Sector Corruption

I would like to commence with some observations about what I will take to be embraced within the notion of "corruption" for the purposes of this paper. The many agencies represented at this conference have been constituted by many and varied legislative instruments, each of which will contain differing provisions defining the scope of conduct which falls within the purview of the particular agency. It is beyond the scope of this paper to endeavour to review the proper construction or interpretation of any of those provisions.

I would, nevertheless, observe that the legislative draftsperson's general aspirations of clarity and certainty are of profound importance in provisions which define the scope of conduct which can be investigated by public sector anti-corruption agencies. In the relatively short history of such agencies in Australia, there have been many occasions upon which legal challenges have been made to their jurisdiction to investigate or to conduct an inquiry arising from uncertainty or imprecision in the provisions of the enabling legislation which define the agency's jurisdiction.

I do not mean to under-estimate the difficulties which confront a legislative draftsperson in this area. The breadth and range of conduct which might properly fall within the jurisdiction of a public sector anti-corruption agency is so varied and unpredictable as to challenge exact definition. Often terms like "misconduct", "improper" and "corrupt" are used. The advantage of terminology of this breadth is the breadth of jurisdiction which it confers upon the agency. The disadvantage is the uncertain scope of
jurisdiction which arises from the use of terminology which arguably incorporates a subjective or qualitative element. In many cases, the impropriety of conduct will be clear and obvious. In other cases close to the margins, impropriety like beauty, can be in the eye of the beholder.

In common parlance, the expression "corruption" is often associated with terms like "bribery" and can be taken to connote criminal or illegal conduct. However, the term also has a broader meaning which includes lack of integrity or propriety and which would include conduct which is debased or tainted but which might not constitute criminal or illegal conduct. My ad hoc review of some of the legislation creating the agencies represented here today would suggest that jurisdiction is more often defined in this broader sense, perhaps best described as conduct which lacks in integrity, and it is in this broader sense that I will use the word "corruption" in this paper.

The Extent of Corruption

It is extremely difficult, in fact almost certainly impossible, to make any reliable estimate of the extent of corruption in this broader sense within the public sector in any particular jurisdiction. It seems extremely likely that much corruption within the public sector will go undetected and unreported. This is true even of the more extreme forms of corruption, such as bribery. In cases involving bribery, both parties to the transaction have very strong incentives to conceal what has occurred. The victim of bribery in the public sector is the community as a whole, and in many cases
that community will be completely unaware that an offence has been committed.

It follows that any estimate of the extent of corruption is likely to be subjective, and may be subconsciously influenced by the purpose of the estimator. An early example of this phenomenon is provided by Genesis chapter 6 verse 12, in which it is asserted that before God cleansed the world with a great flood, the entire world, and all the people in it, were corrupt. This seems an unusually pessimistic view which may have been influenced by the fact that it is expressed in the early part of the first book of the Bible, where one might expect the virtues and benefits of a deity to be extolled.

Similar views were expressed by Plato, who is generally regarded as the father of that branch of philosophy known as metaphysics. In his view, the physical world was entirely corrupt, and it was only the spiritual or intellectual world which had any prospect of purity. Some might say that this is exactly what you would expect a philosopher to assert.

Reference to metaphysics puts me in mind of Woody Allen's confession that he was expelled from university for cheating during his metaphysics examination, because he was caught peeking into the soul of the student sitting next to him.

Plato's political philosophy is also of interest to this conference. In the Socratic dialogues which he published, he proposed that the ideal polity was one over which a "Guardian" presided - being what Plato described as a "Philosopher King". In Republic III, one of
Plato's speakers asserts that it would be ridiculous to speak of a Guardian as needing a Guardian because they are, by definition, incorruptible. Ironically, a number of Plato's students went on to be recognised as tyrants within their city/states - providing evidence for the more contemporary view which underpins this conference - namely, that no citizen is above suspicion.

Such evidence as there is does, however, support at least two observations. First, it is generally a mistake to deny the need to create an anti-corruption agency on the basis of a lack of evidence of widespread corruption. Experience in this country and elsewhere tells us that evidence of corruption is unlikely to be gathered in the absence of the creation of an agency specifically focused upon its detection. Denying the need for an agency on the basis of lack of evidence is perhaps the rough converse of the man who asserted that sprinkling yellow sand around the perimeter of his backyard was an effective means of keeping tigers out of the property. When it was observed that no tigers had been seen near or upon his property, he immediately relied upon this observation as evidence of the efficacy of his programme.

Perhaps put another way, using the lexicon made famous by former US Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, the extent of corruption in any given jurisdiction is an unknown which is known (as opposed to an unknown which is unknown). The creation of agencies such as those represented here today is the best way of gathering at least some data in what has, in the past, been largely an information void.
The second observation which can be drawn from experience is that when anti-corruption agencies are created in any jurisdiction, they become extremely busy. Communities which had laboured under the illusion that corruption in their public sectors, or police forces, was extremely limited and exceptional have had those illusions shattered after agencies have been created.

**International Corruption**

It is pleasing to observe that a number of anti-corruption agencies from other countries are represented at this conference. The impetus towards globalisation which became apparent after World War II has become an irresistible and exponentially accelerating force over the last 20 years through the medium of the world-wide web. Globalisation and inexpensive instantaneous international communication has many advantages, but it also has some disadvantages. As national boundaries have diminished in significance, not least in trade and commerce, they have also diminished in significance in respect of governance and regulation, which is increasingly carried out through international agencies, or international governmental co-operation. At the same time, crime and corruption has gathered in international dimension, and must be addressed at an international level if the remedies are to be effective.

In this context, the development of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, and its broad acceptance, has been a welcome development. I will say a little more about some of the provisions of the convention later in this paper. The challenge which confronts the international community is the challenge of
converting the laudable sentiments and objectives specified in the convention into practical and effective action on a global scale.

There is a very real danger that first world countries like ours leap to assumptions of cultural superiority when international comparisons of behavioural standards are undertaken. The stereotypical view that all third world countries are endemically corrupt, and all first world countries pure and righteous, is not demonstrated by empirical evidence. That said, however, it would be fatuous to deny that different cultures have different standards and expectations of behaviour within the public sector. The danger of the stereotypical view to which I have referred is that it encourages complacency and hubris within developed countries such as ours.

At the risk of furthering that stereotypical view, recent years have shown a general recognition of the importance of anti-corruption measures in international aid efforts. When disasters such as earthquake, flood or famine occur on a scale which necessitates humanitarian aid at an international level, intuitively one is inclined to the view that doctors, nurses and engineers should be the first deployed to the disaster site. However, bitter experience has led to an increasing recognition that proper governance and anti-corruption structures must be implemented at the very outset of any humanitarian aid effort, if that effort is to be effective. In the words of Warren Zevon's song, we need to send lawyers, as well as guns and money.
The Integrity Branch of Government

Recent decades in Australia have seen the creation and recognition of a plethora of agencies whose functions do not fall neatly or conveniently within any of the three branches of government traditionally recognised, namely, the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government. As the Hon J Spigelman AC has pointed out\(^1\), the recognition of an additional branch of government characterised as the integrity branch corresponds roughly with the structure of government which evolved in imperial China many centuries ago.

It is important to note that reference to an "integrity branch" of government should not be taken to suggest that the other branches of government lack functions with respect to the maintenance of public sector integrity. Far from it. The legislative branches of government in Australia have a number of functions which explicitly focus upon the maintenance of public sector integrity, including parliamentary question time, and the investigations conducted by parliamentary committees. Parliament's capacity to discipline its own members, through the Privileges Committee, is another aspect of its integrity functions. Equally clearly, the courts have an important role to play when the maintenance of public sector integrity corresponds with the law which it is the responsibility of the courts to enforce. And within the executive branch of government, well established mechanisms such as managerial accountability, authority of direction and control of subordinate officers, and the availability of disciplinary

\(^1\) The Integrity Branch of Government (2004) 78 ALJ 724
proceedings are important components in the systems which serve to maintain public sector integrity.

However, the fact of this conference, and the fact that you are all here today reflects general recognition that these systems have not been of themselves sufficient to ensure appropriate standards of public sector integrity. For example, in some Australian jurisdictions, hopefully soon to include Western Australia, there are specific mechanisms for the transparent investigation and consideration of complaints against the judiciary.

I have elsewhere reviewed some of the agencies that could be identified as falling within the integrity branch of government, at least within Western Australia\(^2\). Those agencies include the myriad tribunals created around Australia in order to review administrative decisions on their merits, the office of Ombudsman, the agencies available for the enforcement of freedom of information legislation, auditors-general, public sector agencies such as that known in Western Australia as "The Commissioner for Public Sector Standards" and agencies such as the anti-corruption agencies represented here today, which are created for the express purpose of reducing corruption within the public sector.

**Relationships between Integrity Agencies**

My reference to the various agencies which might be loosely grouped within the "integrity branch" of government reveals much opportunity for overlap between the functions and activities of

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those agencies. In Western Australia, an Integrity Coordinating
Group was established in 2005 with representatives of many of the
agencies to which I have referred, with a view to providing greater
policy coherence and operational coordination amongst the
various agencies charged with improving integrity within the public
sector. That appears to me to be a most commendable initiative.

When the jurisdictions of different agencies within the integrity
branch overlap, there can be duplication of effort and tension
between the relevant agencies. Difficult issues can arise when
endeavouring to minimise the extent of this overlap by defining the
jurisdiction of the respective agencies in such a way that they are
mutually exclusive. These difficulties can become acute when the
public sector agency under investigation is an agency involved in
the administration of justice and, to that extent, is itself a part of, or
at least allied to, the integrity branch. I will endeavour to illustrate
my point by taking two examples - the judiciary and the police.

**The Integrity of the Judiciary**

The independence of the judicial branch of government is one of
its essential characteristics. That independence includes the
independence from interference by the executive branch of
government, and is protected by the Constitution of the
Commonwealth of Australia.⁴

Independence is a concept which has many facets. In the context
of judicial independence, those facets include institutional
independence and individual independence. Institutional

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⁴ *South Australia v Totani* [2010] HCA 39 (2010) 242 CLR 1, [1], per French CJ
independence focuses upon the capacity of the Court as an institution to function independently of interference by executive government. Individual independence focuses upon the capacity of the judge to deliver a decision in an individual case impartially, without fear or favour, protected from repercussion or ramification.

There is a tendency to confuse independence with accountability. The two are, however, quite separate notions, and there is no tension between mechanisms that render an independent officer accountable for his or her performance. On the contrary, independence of action reinforces the need for mechanisms of accountability, lest the independence of action be abused. More specifically, in the judicial context, there is no tension between the complete freedom of a judicial officer to decide any particular case in the manner in which he or she decides, and systems which provide an opportunity to investigate and ensure the integrity of the process in any individual case. Without such systems, it is difficult to be confident that judicial officers have, in fact, acted independently and impartially and, in that sense, with integrity.

Perhaps because of erroneous confusion between independence and accountability, specific mechanisms for the maintenance of the integrity of the judicial branch of government are a relatively recent phenomenon. The blunt instrument of removal from office by the Head of State following an address of both Houses of Parliament has not proven particularly effective on those happily rare occasions it has been invoked. More specific structures, which provide for the independent and transparent investigation of the conduct of a judicial officer, have their origins in the Judicial
Commission of New South Wales, which was created about 25 years ago. Other Australian jurisdictions have moved, and are moving, to create similar mechanisms, and the government of Western Australia has provided a reference to the Law Reform Commission of this State to report upon the creation of a similar commission for the investigation of complaints against the judiciary.

When such mechanisms are created, it is necessary to delineate between conduct which is properly investigated by such a body, and conduct which might be better investigated by a different body, such as a general anti-corruption agency. In cases where sophisticated techniques of investigation are required, such as cases involving allegations of criminal conduct by a judge or magistrate, there is much to be said for the proposition that they are better investigated by an anti-corruption agency which is more likely to have the investigative skills required. On the other hand, where the complaint relates to judicial performance - such as delay in the delivery of decisions, or mental disability, there is much to be said for the view that it is better investigated and considered by a body with expertise in assessing the necessary requirements for the effective performance of the judicial function - such as a judicial commission. Although it will often be clear on which side of the line the complaint falls, some complaints against an individual judicial officer may have a number of components, making it more difficult to assess the most appropriate mechanism for investigation. The best that can be done to reduce difficulties of this kind is to define the respective jurisdictions of the different agencies with language which is as clear and unambiguous as
possible, and to provide mechanisms requiring conferral between the agencies involved.

In Western Australia, where there are as yet no specific mechanisms for investigation of complaints against the judiciary, the legislation establishing the Corruption and Crime Commission prevents that Commission from investigating a complaint against the holder of judicial office, unless the complaint involves an allegation of an offence of corruption of judicial office, or is a complaint "of a kind that, if established, would constitute grounds for removal from judicial office". Accordingly, unless criminal corruption is alleged, when any complaint about a judicial officer is received by the Commission, the Commission must address the threshold question of whether the complaint would, if established, constitute grounds for removal from judicial office. The differences of view which have been established over the years between the Judicial Commission of New South Wales and the Parliament of that State in relation to whether or not particular conduct constitutes grounds for removal from judicial office, suggest that in some cases this question will not be easily resolved. The legislation does, however, provide that, when investigating a holder of judicial office, the Commission must act in accordance with conditions and procedures formulated in continuing consultation with the Chief Justice. In practice, this has meant that the Commissioner and the Chief Justice confer, not only in relation to general practices and procedures (which are the subject of a published protocol), but also in the specific application of those procedures in any individual case concerning a complaint against  

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4 Corruption and Crime Commission Act 2003 (WA), s 27A(3).
a judicial officer. That system seems to me to have worked quite well.

**Complaints Against Police**

Anti-corruption agencies will inevitably be required to liaise closely with police when the matters under investigation include allegations of criminal conduct. On occasions, that liaison may include cooperation in the conduct of a joint investigation. Because of the investigative skills required by the personnel of an anti-corruption agency, often those personnel will be recruited from police forces. If the anti-corruption agency is also given a role with respect to the investigation of allegations of misconduct by police, the potential for conflicts of interest is obvious. That potential has been recognised in New South Wales, where quite separate structures have been created, with the Police Integrity Commission having responsibility for the investigation of police misconduct, and the Independent Commission against Corruption having responsibility for the investigation of other public sector agencies.

The lack of separate agencies of this kind in Western Australia has been a continuing source of controversy since the creation of the Corruption and Crime Commission. That controversy has been exacerbated by the conferral upon the Commission of a function with respect to the investigation of organised crime, which provides an institutional framework which requires cooperation between the Corruption and Crime Commissioner and the Commissioner of Police. In the performance of that function, the Corruption and Crime Commission essentially provides a facility for hearings at which witnesses can be compelled to provide information in
response to questions posed by investigators acting on the instructions of police. The government of this State has announced that it proposes to strengthen the functions of the Commission with respect to the investigation of organised crime, which will presumably require even greater liaison between the Commission and police.

A number of commentators have suggested that this institutional relationship between the Commission and police compromises the capacity of the Commission to investigate complaints of misconduct by police officers. In the past these criticisms have been met with assertions that it is possible to create Chinese walls around any particular investigation of police misconduct, so as to ensure that the investigation is not compromised. I have insufficient knowledge of the practical workings of the Commission, or of investigations into police misconduct, to express any meaningful view as to which of these countervailing views is to be preferred.

The Accountability of Integrity Agencies
To all but Plato, the need to ensure the independence of integrity agencies, including anti-corruption agencies, is as obvious as the need to ensure the independence of the judiciary. However, as I have already observed, independence is not to be confused with accountability and reinforces the need for appropriate accountability mechanisms. Most jurisdictions which have created anti-corruption agencies have recognised this fact, and have created differing mechanisms for the oversight of those agencies. It is beyond the scope of this paper to review the differing oversight
mechanisms which have been created, especially as they are many and varied. At the risk of being accused of being parochial, I will, however, use the mechanisms which have been created in this State to illustrate the proposition that the precise role and function of the oversight mechanism must be defined with care.

The legislation creating the Corruption and Crime Commission of Western Australia provides a number of mechanisms for the oversight of the activities of that Commission. They include mechanisms by which the Commission is required to report to the Parliament on particular investigations, and periodically. There is also a standing committee of the Parliament which regularly reviews the activities of the Commission, and which is consulted in relation to the appointments of the Commissioner and any acting Commissioners.

In addition, the legislation creates the office of Parliamentary Inspector of the Commission. The functions of the Parliamentary Inspector include:

- to audit the operation of the Act;
- to audit the operations of the Commission for the purpose of monitoring compliance with the laws of the State;
- to deal with matters of misconduct on the part of the Commission, officers of the Commission and officers of the Parliamentary Inspector;
- to audit any operation carried out pursuant to the powers conferred or made available by this Act;
- to assess the effectiveness and appropriateness of the Commission’s procedures;
- to make recommendations to the Commission, independent agencies and appropriate authorities;
• to report and make recommendations to either House of Parliament and the Standing Committee …”

The legislation also provides that the functions of the Parliamentary Inspector may be performed on the initiative of the Parliamentary Inspector, or at the request of the Minister, or in response to a matter reported to the Parliamentary Inspector.

There has been considerable tension between Commissioners and Parliamentary Inspectors in relation to the proper ambit of the Parliamentary Inspector's jurisdiction and functions. Successive Commissioners have expressed the view that the provisions I have set out indicate that the essential character of the function is an audit function to be performed across the general range of the Commission's functions, and is not to be construed as empowering the Parliamentary Inspector to review and challenge the findings made by the Commission in any particular case. Parliamentary Inspectors have taken a different view of the functions conferred upon the office, and have used the powers of the office to entertain complaints made by those who have been investigated by the Commission, and to provide reports to the Parliament to the effect that particular findings of the Commission in individual cases were flawed.

The tensions between previous holders of the respective positions of Commissioner and Parliamentary Inspector have, at times, been manifested in strident public criticism of each other. At one point the tension was so great as to move the then Commissioner to seek injunctive relief from the Supreme Court restraining the then

Parliamentary Inspector from presenting a report to the Parliament.\footnote{Corruption and Crime Commission of Western Australia v McCusker AO QC [2009] WASC 44} When the matter came before me, I suggested that any order of the Court would very likely constitute a contempt of the Parliament, and suggested that the parties might like to give further consideration to other ways in which these issues could be resolved. Happily, the litigation was resolved before any definitive ruling was required. However, it is, I think, fair to say that these tensions have been a continuing source of distraction from the important work of each office holder, and the public manifestation of those tensions has not enhanced public confidence.

**Public accountability of anti-corruption agencies**

Public confidence is an essential component for the effective operation of any anti-corruption agency. Public confidence is enhanced by public accountability. I have already referred to some of the usual mechanisms for public accountability, including public reports, accountability to Parliament, and specific oversight mechanisms. More controversial, is the use of public hearings as a mechanism of public accountability.

The question of whether or not anti-corruption agencies should generally conduct hearings in public has been a subject of controversy in most jurisdictions which have created such agencies. In Western Australia, it has been a subject of particular controversy since the creation of the Corruption and Crime Commission, given that its predecessor, the Anti-Corruption Commission, never held hearings in public.
The controversy arises from the conflict between a number of competing considerations. The considerations in favour of public hearings include the proposition succinctly put by Frank Costigan QC:

"Once you start investigating allegations of public corruption privately, then you add the smell of a cover-up."

Other considerations which favour public hearings include the fact that the community is aware of the work being done by the agency, and useful information can flow to the agency as a result of publicity given to its activities. Importantly, the conduct of public hearings performs an educative role which can be of great significance in the fulfilment of the preventative function which is conferred upon many anti-corruption agencies, and of which I will say a little below.

On the other hand, there are a number of considerations against the holding of public hearings, perhaps the most significant of which is the irreparable damage that might be done to the reputations of particular individuals during the course of such hearings, irrespective of the findings ultimately made by the agency. The prospect of damage to reputation is exacerbated by the risk that the public might focus upon the questions asked of a witness during a hearing, rather than the answers given, especially where the line of questioning is salacious. Other considerations include possible prejudice to the investigative function by discouraging those who might have information from coming forward, lest they be caught in the glare of publicity, and by alerting

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those who might themselves be subject to subsequent investigation of the lines of enquiry or cross-examination that are being pursued.

The balancing of these competing considerations is a difficult task. There can be no general answer to the question of where the balance lies, because in any particular enquiry, or part of an inquiry, the weight to be given to particular considerations will depend upon the particular circumstances of the enquiry. The only opinion I would venture to those charged with making these difficult assessments is drawn from my experience in the courts and from my observation that public confidence in the integrity of the administration of justice critically depends upon the transparency of that process, and the fact that it is only in the most rare and exceptional circumstances that any part of that process will be conducted behind closed doors. That experience, and the significance which I attach to the educative and preventative functions, incline me to the view that hearings should be held in public unless there is a good reason to the contrary. In the context of the administration of justice, it has long been accepted that the risk of damage to reputation is the price which must be paid for transparency.

**Prevention**

There is an old saying that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. I would like to conclude this paper by emphasising the critical importance of that notion in the effort against corruption.
Earlier in this paper, I noted the difficulty which attends any assessment of the extent of corruption in the public sector. The same considerations support the view that it is highly likely that corruption will go undetected. The creation of the various agencies represented here today diminishes that risk, but as with any so-called victim-less crime\textsuperscript{8}, such as misuse of drugs, detection rates will inevitably be low because of the unlikelihood of report. Because of the low report rate, when reports are made, it is essential that they be investigated thoroughly and effectively, and if corruption is established, significant sanctions imposed both as a warning to others and by way of emphatic denunciation of the misconduct involved.

However, the growth of government, and the growing number and diversity of public sector agencies, makes it impractical to have an investigator perched in the corner of every public sector office. Mechanisms for the investigation and punishment of misconduct are an important component of the fight against corruption, but they will never of themselves be sufficient. It is my view that public education and prevention, by encouraging an ethos of integrity within the public sector is, by far, the most effective means of discouraging misconduct within that sector.

The importance of preventative policies and practices has been explicitly recognised in the United Nations Convention Against Corruption. Article 5 of that Convention provides:

\textsuperscript{8} The victim is in fact the community
1. Each State party shall, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its legal system, develop and implement or maintain effective, coordinated anti-corruption policies that promote the participation of society and reflect the principles of the rule of law, proper management of public affairs and public property, integrity, transparency and accountability.

2. Each State party shall endeavour to establish and promote effective practices aimed at the prevention of corruption.

3. Each State party shall endeavour to periodically evaluate relevant legal instruments and administrative measures with a view to determining their adequacy to prevent and fight corruption.

4. State parties shall, as appropriate and in accordance with the fundamental principles of their legal system, collaborate with each other and with relevant international and regional organisations in promoting and developing the measures referred to in this article. That collaboration may include participation in international programs and projects aimed at the prevention of corruption."

Article 6 obliges each State party to ensure the existence of a body or bodies capable of preventing corruption by implementing the policies referred to in Article 5.

This conference is itself a manifestation of the principles enunciated in these articles of the UN Convention. The opportunity which it provides for interaction between agencies engaged in the fight against corruption, not only within Australia, but elsewhere, will inevitably enhance the efficacy of each of the agencies represented. The interchange of ideas and experience which will take place over the succeeding days of this conference will, I am sure, provide you with both information and inspiration
with which to return to that fight, not only in the performance of your investigative functions, but, as I have stressed, perhaps most importantly of all, in the performance of your educative and preventative functions.